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INTRODUCTION
On May 20th, 1996, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Alabama held in United States v. Olin Corp. that
the liability provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act' (CERCLA) could not be applied to
activities that predated CERCLA's enactment.2  This decision
represented a significant departure from several previous cases that
found CERCLA applied retroactively.3 On March 25, 1997, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district
court decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.' Both of
these cases received significant attention in environmental trade
publications.' Because CERCLA represents the primary legal authority
used to hold responsible parties liable for hazardous substance response
142 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1996).
2United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996) [hereinafter Olin 1).
3See generally United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Northeastem Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v.
Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Colo. 1985); Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D.
Ohio 1984).
4United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506 (11 th Cir. 1997) [hereinafter Olin I].
'See, e.g., AL Retroactiviy Ruling 'Patently Erroneous, 'DOJ Tells l1th Circuit,
HAZARDOUS WASTE LrrIG. REP., Aug. 9, 1996, at 30763; The Olin Decision Controversy, MASS.
ENVTL. COMPLIANCE UPDATE, Vol. 4, No. 10, Aug. 1996; Retroactive Application of CERCLA
Questioned in Two Cases, REAL ESTATE/ENVTL. LIABILITY NEWS, Vol. 7, No. 18, July 22, 1996.
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costs, the issue of whether CERCLA applies retroactively has
significant economic,' environmental, and political' ramifications.
This Article is composed of four sections. Part I provides a
background of CERCLA and examines the facts and holdings of the
district court and court of appeals decisions in United States v. Olin
Corp. Part II evaluates the analysis used by the court of appeals and
compares the analysis with other decisions that have also examined
CERCLA's retroactive application. Part III addresses other issues that
have been analyzed during judicial examinations of CERCLA's
retroactive application. Part IV evaluates the Olin decisions in light of
prior caselaw, suggests how CERCLA's retroactivity should be
addressed, and discusses how a reauthorization of CERCLA may affect
existing law. The Article concludes by explaining that if Congress
reaches an agreement on changes to CERCLA' s retroactive application,
it is more likely that the changes will take the form of specific
exemptions to CERCLA liability, rather than a universal repeal of
retroactive liability.
6There are currently 1,300 sites on the National Priorities List (NPL). The NPL
identifies the nation's CERCLA sites that require the most immediate response action. It is
estimated that the average expense of cleaning up each of these sites is $30 million. Moreover,
this figure does not include various transaction costs associated with CERCLA response actions.
Lindsay Newland Bowker, Beyond Polarization: Superfund Reform in Perspective, REAL
ESTATE/ENVTL. LIABILITY NEWS, Vol. 8, No. 6, Jan. 24, 1997. See also Barnett M. Lawrence,
Comment, Liability of Corporate Officers Under CERCLA: An Ounce of Prevention May Be the
Cure, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,377 (Sept. 1990) (describing the costs of CERCLA
response actions).
'One of the most frequent criticisms aimed at CERCLA is that a significant portion of
the money spent on response actions does not facilitate the actual cleanup of the environment.
Rather, most of the money is spent on litigation and administrative expenses. See, e.g., Bowker,
supra note 6. At the end of 1996, $13.4 billion had been spent on CERCLA response actions, yet
only 161 sites had been cleaned up. Much of the inefficiency is due to the fact that litigation plays
a major role in CERCLA response actions. Id.
'There have been several legislative efforts to reform CERCLA. The degree, content,
and focus of reform has been a major source of conflict within the 103rd, 104th, and 105th
Congresses. Senate Republicans have indicated that CERCLA reform is one of the top ten
legislative priorities for the 105th Congress. See Senate GOP Unveils Reauthorization Plan,
SUPERFUND WEEK, Vol. 11, No. 4, Jan. 24, 1997; Update on Superfund Reform, WASH. ENVTL.
COMPLIANCE UPDATE, Vol. 3, No. 5, Nov. 1996; infra notes 201-207 and accompanying text
(discussing political efforts addressing CERCLA's retroactive application).
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I. CERCLA BACKGROUND AND THE OLIN DECISIONS
A. Background of CERCLA
The need for a statute to address liability for hazardous
substance response actions became apparent during the 1970s. During
that time period, environmental disasters such as Love Canal9 and the
Valley of the Drums'0 received broad public attention. In response to
public alarm over such incidents, Congress enacted CERCLA on
December 11, 1980.
CERCLA (the "Act") provides for the cleanup of hazardous
substance sites by allocating response costs among the parties
responsible for contamination." The Act imposes a severe liability
'After investigating health complaints by residents in the Love Canal area of Niagra
Falls, the New York Health Department learned that toxic chemicals had seeped into the basements
of many homes and contaminated local soil, air, and water. Air pollution reached as much as
5,000 times maximum safety levels. The Hooker Chemical and Plastics Corporation had used a
waterway as a depository for approximately 352 million pounds of industrial wastes. This
contamination required the evacuation of 1,000 families and $30 million in cleanup expenses.
ROGER W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 493 (3rd ed. 1991). See also
S. REP. No. 96-848, at 2, 7755-61 (1980); President's Remarks on Signing H.R. 39 into Law, 16
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 2757 (Dec. 2, 1980) (noting public concern over environmental and
public health hazards posed by the improper disposal of hazardous substances).
"5EPA discovered 17,000 drums of waste on a seven acre site near Louisville, Kentucky.
Approximately 6,000 of those drums were releasing toxic chemicals into the environment. -S. REP.
No. 96-848 at 4 (1980), reprinted in Environmental and Natural Resources Policy Division,
Library on Congress, 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL
RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980 (SUPERFUND), SENATE COMMITTEE ON
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, at 311 [hereinafter I CERCLA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
IISection 104 of CERCLA authorizes the President to conduct removal and remedial
action in response to: (1) a release or a substantial threat of a release of a hazardous substance into
the environment, or (2) a release or a substantial threat of release into the environment of any
pollutant or contaminant that may present an imminent and substantial danger to public health or
welfare. CERCLA § 104,42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1996). This authority has been delegated to various
federal agencies. Exec. Order No. 12,580,52 Fed. Reg. 2,923 (1987). Those federal agencies can
conduct response actions themselves and seek to recover response costs from responsible parties,
or they may compel a responsible party to conduct the response action. Id. Response action
includes both removal and remedial action. Of the two actions, remedial action is usually
appropriate when the contamination is more severe or extensive (i.e., when the threat or release
cannot be adequately addressed by removal action). Examples of removal action may include the
use of security fencing, the provision of alternative water supplies, or the temporary evacuation and
housing of threatened individuals. CERCLA § 101 (23). 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1996). Examples
of remedial actions include: repair or replacement of leaking containers; onsite treatment or
incineration; segregation of reactive wastes; and the use of perimeter protection measures such as
dikes, trenches, or ditches. CERCLA § 101(24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1996). See CERCLA §
101 (23), (24) (providing complete definitions of removal and remedial action).
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scheme that greatly favors the recovery of costs incurred for removal
and remedial actions.
12
CERCLA's liability scheme is composed of three major
components. First, CERCLA establishes that a broad range of persons
may be potentially responsible parties (PRPs). Section 107 of the Act
provides that current owners and operators of disposal sites, past
owners and operators of disposal sites, persons who arranged for
disposal, and transporters of hazardous substances are all potentially
liable for the payment of response costs.'3
Second, CERCLA establishes that responsible parties are
subject to strict, joint, and several liability. Consequently, one
responsible party may be liable for all of the government's response
costs. This liability may occur even if that responsible party acted
without negligence or illegal intention.'4 It also makes no difference
that the responsible party contributed only a small portion of the
release.'5 Costs recoverable by the government include all costs
associated with each element of the response action, including direct
costs, indirect costs, and interest.' 6 The responsible party may,
however, seek financial contribution from other PRPs.'
2Responsible parties are liable for all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by
the United States government not inconsistent with the National Contingency Plan (NCP) (as
provided for in section 105 of CERCLA); any other necessary response costs incurred by any other
person consistent with the NCP; damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources
(including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such
a release); and the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out under section
104(l) of CERCLA. CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(aX4XA) (1996). The amounts
recoverable under section 107 also include interest that starts accruing on the date that payment
of a specified amount is demanded in writing or the date of the expenditure. Id.
"CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1996). Section 107(a) provides in relevant
part that "(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, (2) any person who at the time of
disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous
substances were disposed of, (3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or who arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment,
of hazardous substances,... (4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person,
from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs,
ofa hazardous substance, shall be liable for - (A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred
by the United States government or a State...; (B) any other necessary costs of response incurred
by any other person...; (C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources,
including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury...".
"Because of the strict liability scheme, a party may be liable even if that party fully
complied with all applicable hazardous substance disposal requirements at the time of disposal.
'"CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1996).
"See United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1499 (6th Cir. 1989).
"A responsible party would generally seek financial contribution from other responsible
parties under section 113(f) of CERCLA. Section 113(f) provides that any person may seek
contribution from any party that may be potentially liable under section 107(a) of CERCLA. In
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Third, CERCLA provides only limited defenses to its extensive
liability scheme. Liability can only be avoided when the release
resulted from an act of God, an act of war, an act or omission of a third
party other than an employee or agent of the defendant, or any
combination of those defenses."2 Because the liability scheme of
CERCLA is so exacting, 9 the application of CERCLA liability to
preenactment activities represents a critical issue for numerous
defendants.
B. The District Court Decision
The events that lead to the Olin decisions originated in the
1950s. The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
acting through the United States Department of Justice (DOJ), alleged
that Olin Mathieson operated two chemical plants between 1952 and
1982 that released mercury and chloroform into the environment.
20
Most of the alleged contamination occurred before the date of
CERCLA's enactment.2'
Accompanying EPA's complaint was a consent decree which
both parties had signed. The consent decree provided that the Olin
Corporation would be liable for all expenses related to the site's
cleanup.22 Despite both parties' willingness to enter into the consent
decree, the district court, on its own initiative, requested that the
litigants brief the issue of whether CERCLA could be applied
retroactively. 3 The court explained that this briefing was necessary
resolving aclaim for contribution, a court may allocate response costs using such equitable factors
as the court determines are appropriate. CERCLA § 113(0, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(o (1996).
1'CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1996).
"'CERCLA liability has been described as "a black hole that indiscriminately devours
all who come near it." Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. Dorothy B. Godwin Cal. Living Trust,
32 F.3d 1364, 1366 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Jerry L. Anderson, The Hazardous Waste Land, 13
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 6-7 (1993)).
'0United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502, 1504 (S.D. Ala. 1996) (citing EPA
Record of Decision at 8-10). The releases occurred through the use of a mercury-ceil chloralkali
plant and the later operation of a "crop-protection-chemical" plant. The company heading these
operations began calling itself the Olin Corporation in 1978. The Olin plant site is comprised of
1,500 acres and lies in McIntosh, Alabama. EPA listed the Olin plant site on the NPL in 1982.
Id.
2The consent decree required the Olin Corporation to spend approximately $10.3
million to clean up the site and granted EPA broad discretion to amend the cleanup plan.
According to the court, the decree made the Olin Corporation, its officers, directors, and associates
liable for everything "even remotely associated with the cleanup" including the cost of insuring
the government's automobiles used in fulfilling and supervising the consent decree. Id. at 1505.
'31d. at 1506-07.
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because the court had a duty to ensure that the consent decree did not
violate the United States Constitution, federal statutes, or controlling
jurisprudence. 4 After its review, the district court determined that
CERCLA could not be applied retroactively."
The district court began its opinion by declaring that the
Eleventh Circuit had never directly examined whether CERCLA
applied retroactively.26 Although acknowledging that several federal
courts had determined that CERCLA applied retroactively, 27 the district
court asserted that none of these decisions addressed CERCLA's
retroactivity after the Supreme Court's decision in Landgraf v. USI
Film Products.2  Although Landgraf addressed the retroactive
application of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,29 the district court declared
thatthe Supreme Court decision "demolishes" the interpretive premises
upon which prior courts had based CERCLA's retroactive application.3"
Lancgrafarose out of a sexual harassment suit filed against USI
Film Products." The case addressed whether a provision in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 applied to preenactment activities.32 Landgraf
provided that a court must consider three steps of analysis to determine
41d at 1507.
2It is important to note that there may have been some resentment to EPA's proposed
consent decree by both Olin Corp. and the district court. The district court commented, "This is
not an action in which anyone is trying to avoid a responsibility to the environment; Olin has
agreed to perform the proposed remedial actions called for in the consent degree. The fact that
Olin, despite its reservations about the fairness and even legality of the proposed consent decree,
originally went along with the EPA is a vivid testament to the powerlessness felt by this citizen
when forced to comply with various directives ordered by our administrative state." Id. at 1506
n. 17. In a case decided alter Olin I, the court suggested that the Olin district court decision may
have been a reaction to the rigidity of EPA's proposed consent decree and to EPA's denial of
Olin's request to conduct cleanup operations under the supervision of the Alabama Department
of Environmental Management. See Nova Chems., Inc. v, GAF Corp., 945 F. Supp. 1098, 1102
n.6 (E.D. Tenn. 1996).
26Olin 1, 927 F. Supp. at 1507. But see Virginia Properties Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 74
F.3d 1131, 1132 (1 th Cir. 1996) (referring to CERCLA's retroactivity).
2"See generally United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397 (D.N.J. 1991); United States
v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cit. 1988); United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem.
Co., 810 F.2d. 726 (8th Cir. 1986); Ohio exrel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D.
Ohio 1983); United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
28511 U.S. 244 (1994).
"Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
"Olin 1, 927 F. Supp. at 1508.
"The plaintiff, Barbara Landgraf, asserted that a coworker had repeatedly harassed her
during working hours. Landgraf 511 U.S. at 247-48.
"2While the plaintiff was waiting to appeal her district court decision, the President
signed into law the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 created
a right to ajury trial during efforts to recover compensatory and punitive damages. The plaintiff
asserted that section 102 applied to her case. See id. at 247.
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whether a statute is retroactive. First, the examining court should
determine whether the statute's text or legislative history clearly
established a Congressional intent to apply the law retroactively. Ifthis
first inquiry is inconclusive, the court should determine whether the
statutory provision at issue has a retroactive effect33 on the litigants. If
there is a retroactive effect, the court should determine whether the
traditional presumption against retroactivity34 applies to the statutory
provision at issue. The traditional presumption against retroactivity can
only be rebutted by showing that Congress clearly intended the statute
to apply retroactively." The Olin district court used these three steps
in determining that CERCLA could not be applied to conduct that
occurred before CERCLA's enactment.
In the first step of the Landgraf analysis, the district court
determined that neither CERCLA's language nor CERCLA's legislative
history clearly indicated that Congress intended CERCLA to be
retroactive.36 The district court conceded that the use of past tense in
CERCLA's language provided "some evidence" that Congress intended
sections 106(a) and 107(a) to apply retroactively, but the district court
determined this evidence did not support a finding that Congress clearly
intended the provisions to apply retroactively.37 The district court
emphasized that CERCLA lacks any language that specifically indicates
a Congressional intent favoring retroactivity. 3 The district court also
33A retroactive effect is one that impairs the rights that a party possessed when the party
acted, increases a party's liability for past conduct, or imposes new duties with respect to
transactions already completed. Id. at 269.
"The presumption against retroactivity provides that prospective application of a new
rule of law is the appropriate default rule because the presumption accords with the widely held
expectations. Id. at 273.
"Requiring clear intent assures that Congress has appropriately considered the potential
unfairness that retroactive application of a law may effect. Such a requirement forces Congress
to make necessary policy choices and to determine that the potential unfairness is an acceptable
price to pay for the countervailing benefits brought about bythe retroactive application of the law.
Id. at 272-73.
"United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502, 1519 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
"id. at 1513 (concurring with Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300,
1309-11 (N.D. Ohio 1983) and United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1073 (D. Colo.
1985)). Section 106(a) provides that when the President determines that there may be an imminent
and substantial endangerment to public health, welfare, or the environment because of an actual
or threatened release, the President may require the Attorney General to secure such relief as
necessary to abate such danger or threat. The President may also, after notice to the affected State,
take other action, including the issuance of such orders as may be necessary to protect public
health and welfare and the environment. CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1996).
"Olin 1, 927 F. Supp. at 1512 n.39 (stating that DOJ and other parties have conceded
that there are no unequivocal statements in CERCLA indicating a Congressional intent to make
CERCLA apply retroactively). See also Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300,1309
(N.D. Ohio 1983) (discussing CERCLA's absence of an express provision on retroactivity); Long
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concluded that CERCLA's legislative history offers little insight into
Congress' intentions. 9 The district court added that previous cases,
which determined that CERCLA applied retroactively, either found
evidence that did not exist" or conducted insufficient legal analysis."
Accordingly, the district court proceeded to the second and third steps
of the Landgrafanalysis.
In the second line of analysis, the district court concluded that
CERCLA had a retroactive effect because application of its liability
provisions attaches new legal consequences to events completed before
CERCLA's enactment.42 In reaching this conclusion, the district court
rejected DOJ's position that the release at the Olin site represented a
continuing release of hazardous substances, part of which occurred after
CERCLA's enactment.43 Therefore, the district court proceeded to the
third step of analysis: whether the presumption against retroactivity
should be applied to the particular provisions at issue."
There is an established legal tradition disfavoring retroactive
application of new laws.45 A major justification for this tradition is that
Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. Dorothy B. Godwin Cal. Living Trust, 32 F.3d 1364, 1366 (9th Cir.
1994). 9The district court commented, "The most that can be said from the legislative history
is that Congress left many questions, including retroactivity, as open ones to be decided later."
Olin 1, 927 F. Supp. at 1515. The reason for the shortage of legislative debate is that Congress
passed CERCLA during the final days of an outgoing Congressional session. The impending
deadline limited the amount of debate and analysis that could be focused on the bill. Id See infra
notes 95-107 and accompanying text regarding CERCLA's enactment process.
"Id. at 1514-15 (asserting that previous cases interpreting CERCLA's legislative
history have reached improper conclusions by "find[ing] clarity in legislative history which does
not exist," or "plac[ing] weight on sources that have little or no value").
"Id. at 1509-10 (commenting "[a]s forNortheastern, onwhich [Department of) Justice
relies, the case treats the presumption itself rather lightly .. "). See also United States v.
Northeastern Pharm. and Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 732-33 (8th Cir. 1986).
"Id. at 1516. The district court declared that application of section 107(a) ofCERCLA
in this case would impose new duties on completed transactions. Id It is important to clarify that
the district court distinguished whether a statute has a retroactive effect and whether the statute
can be applied retroactively (i.e., is retroactive). The district court held that, while CERCLA has
a retroactive effect, CERCLA was not intended to be retroactive (and therefore could not be
applied retroactively). Id. at 1516-19.
41d. at 1516 n.55. DOJ claimed the continuing nature of the release involved sufficient
post-enactment conduct to hold the Olin Corporation liable even without retroactive application
of the law. DOJ cited several cases indicating that legislation which is designed to alleviate a
continuing public nuisance does not operate retroactively. See id. (citing Samuels v. McCurdy,
267 U.S. 188 (1925); Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67 (1915)).
44Id. at 1516.
"Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994) (stating that the presumption
against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in American jurisprudence and embodies a legal
doctrine centuries older than the Republic). Unless Congress has made its intentions clear, courts
have declined to give statutes retroactive application due to considerations of fair notice,
reasonable reliance, and settled expectations. Id. at 269.
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individuals should have the opportunity to be aware of a law and
conform their conduct accordingly.46 This is especially true in areas of
law where predictability and stability are essential. Such areas include
the law of contracts, property, and other areas involving financial
liability.47  On this basis, courts should not apply a new law
retroactively unless Congress has clearly indicated such an intent.48
In its analysis, the district court noted that new provisions
affecting punitive and compensatory damages were generally
prospective unless Congress clearly indicated otherwise.49 The district
court found that the damages provided in sections 107 and 106 of
CERCLA were more detrimental to defendants than compensatory
damages."0 Therefore, the district court concluded that the presumption
against retroactive application must apply to sections 107(a) and
106(a)." Because neither CERCLA's statutory language nor
CERCLA's legislative history provided the clear evidence necessary to
overcome the presumption against retroactivity, the district court
concluded that CERCLA is not retroactive.
SId.
4"Id. at 271. The Supreme Court commented that in no case "in which Congress had
not clearly spoken, have we read a statute substantially increasing the monetary liability of a
private party to apply to conduct occurring before the statute's enactment." Id. at 284. But see
id. at 269-70 n.24 (noting that governments may impose retroactive taxes and zoning regulations
on past behavior in order to remedy past conduct). The Supreme Court noted, however, that when
Congress enacts statutes with retroactive effects, the statutes are often aimed at correcting past
mistakes and responding to emergencies. Id. at 267-68.
"Ild. at 270. Such a requirement gives Congress the responsibility for making
fundamental policy choices. Id at 272-73. It is important to note, however, that in contrast to
areas affecting financial liability, statutory provisions affecting procedural matters are presumed
to apply to cases occurring after the statute's enactment (even if the cause of action occurred prior
to the provision's enactment). See id. at 280 (stating that a right to a jury trial is plainly a
procedural change that would ordinarily govern in trials conducted after its effective date).
"Olin 1, 927 F. Supp. at 1517. See also Landgraf 511 U.S. at 278-79 (discussing
situations where laws are retroactive).
"Olin I, 927 F. Supp. at 1517. The district court found that section 107(c)(3) provides
for punitive and treble damages which EPA uses as a"threat" during negotiations, and section 106
provides punitive fines for the failure to comply with executive orders. Id. This finding was
important in determining whether the provisions could be applied retroactively because in
Landgraf the Supreme Court refused to apply compensatory relief retroactively. Landgraf, 511
U.S. at 281-82. On this basis, if the damages provided for by section 106 and section 107 were
more detrimental to defendants than compensatory damages, there would be increasedjustification
for not applying CERCLA retroactively.
"Olin 1, 927 F. Supp. at 1517-18.
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C. The Court of Appeals Decision
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit overruled the
district court's opinion on CERCLA's retroactivity. 2 The court of
appeals examined the issue of CERCLA's retroactive application de
novo and concluded that Congress clearly intended that CERCLA's
liability provisions apply to preenactment activities. The court of
appeals based its decision on two primary factors. First, the court found
that CERCLA's language confirmed that Congress clearly intended
CERCLA to apply retroactively." In particular, the court of appeals
asserted that the language of section 103 demonstrated a clear
Congressional intent that the Act apply retroactively. 4 Second, the
court of appeals held that CERCLA's purpose, as evidenced by the
statute's structure and legislative history, also indicated that Congress
intended the statute to impose retroactive liability. 5 The court
emphasized that a major purpose of CERCLA was to require
responsible parties to pay environmental cleanup costs.5 6 The court also
stressed that members of Congress generally believed that CERCLA
and the legislative bills which preceded CERCLA were to apply
retroactively." The court of appeals concluded this evidence was
sufficiently persuasive to overcome the presumption against
2United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506 (1 lth Cir. 1997).
'31d. at 1513.
'Ald. Section 103 of CERCLA provides, "Within one hundred and eighty days after
December 11, 1980, any person who owns or operates or who at the time of disposal owned or
operated ... a facility at which hazardous substances ... are or have been stored, treated, or disposed
of shall ... notify the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency of the existence of
such facility, specifying the amount and type of any hazardous substance to be found there, and
any known, suspected, or likely releases of such substances from such facility." CERCLA §
103(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(c) (1996).




1d. The court of appeals cited Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Fiberbond Corp., 946
F. Supp. 651, 662 (N.D. Ind. 1996) for the proposition that all the members of Congress
commenting on parallel legislative bills expressed belief that the legislation would apply
retroactively. Olin 11, 107 F.3d at 1514. In its analysis of the legislative history, the court in Ninth
Avenue focused on the fact that members of Congress intended that the persons responsible for the
releases would pay the cost of responding to the abandoned hazardous substance sites. Ninth Ave.
Remedial Group v. Fiberbond Corp., 946 F. Supp. at 661-63.
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retroactivity.5" Based on these reasons, the appellate court reversed the
district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings.59
11. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
A. The Court of Appeals Decision on Landgraf
The court of appeals in Olin concurred with the district court
in finding that Landgraf provides the analytical framework for
determining whether a newly enacted" statutory provision applies
retroactively.61 Unlike the district court, however, the court of appeals
did not find that Landgraf radically altered the interpretative premises
upon which earlier courts approached retroactive analysis.62 The court
of appeals emphasized that Landgraf does not require that the law at
issue contain a clear statement mandating retroactivity; rather, Landgraf
only requires that there be a clear Congressional intent for retroactive
application.63 In this respect, the difference between the district court
and the court of appeals decisions lies in their evaluations of whether
there is enough evidence to demonstrate a clear Congressional intent
favoring retroactivity.
'The court of appeals cited Landgraf for the proposition that "constitutional
impediments to retroactive civil legislation are now modest." Id. at 1512 (quoting Landgrafv. USI
Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 272 (1994))- It is important to clarify the purpose of the Supreme
Court's statement was not to demonstrate why retroactive application of laws should be easier, but
rather to indicate why each court should place great emphasis on the presumption against
retroactivity. The Supreme Court in Landgraf was emphasizing why the presumption against
retroactivity served such an important and necessary role. The statement was not, as the court of
appeals indicates, evidence intended to support the application of retroactive liability.
"Olin 11, 107 F.3d at 1515.
'As an aside, the court of appeals noted that Landgraf guides the review of "newly
enacted laws." Id. at 1512 n. 14. The court of appeals declared that there was no indication that
Landgraf should be used to upset longstanding interpretations of existing laws. Id. The court of
appeals concluded that although "a strong argument can be made that courts ought not to employ
[LandgraJ] to upset years of reliance on prior interpretations of existing laws," the court declined
to firther examine the issue because: (1) the issue was not raised by the parties, and (2) the court
of appeals did not view Landgraf as providing a radical new course of interpretive analysis. Id.6 Id. at 1512 (recognizing that Landgraf "provides the analytical framework for
determining whether newlyenacted statutory provisions are applicable to pendingcases") (quoting
Hunter v. United States, 101 F.3d 1565, 1569 (11 th Cir. 1996)).
62See id at 1512 n. 14 (stating that Landgrafreaffirms a "traditional presumption").
631d. at 1513 n. 16 (discussing that three of the Justices objected because the Landgraf
majority adopted a "clear intent" standard, rather than a "clear statement" standard). See also
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 266.
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B. CERCLA's Statutory Language
1. The Use of the Past Tense in CERCLA's Language
In determining that Congress clearly intended to apply
CERCLA retroactively, the court of appeals first examined CERCLA's
language. Using CERCLA's date of enactment as the point of
reference, the court of appeals found that because section 107(a)(1)
imposes liability upon owners and operators of any site where a
hazardous substance "has been deposited," and because section
107(a)(2) extends liability upon "any person who at the time ofdisposal
of any hazardous substance owned or operated' such a site facility,'
Congress intended to hold former owners and operators liable for
preenactment activities.65
The court of appeals acknowledged that one may assert
Congress intended the language of section 107 to apply prospectively66
but disagreed with such an assertion for two reasons. First, the court of
appeals held that there is insufficient evidence from either CERCLA's
provisions or its legislative history to support such a position.67 Second,
the court of appeals claimed that the Act's other language demonstrates
that Congress intended to apply CERCLA retroactively.
6 8
Several other courts have also examined the verb tenses in
section 107, and they have found the use of the past tense is evidence
regarding Congressional intent on retroactivity.69 Some of these courts
have concluded that section 107 demonstrates that Congress clearly
intended that CERCLA apply retroactively.7" For example, in Cooper
Industries v. Agway, Inc., the district court for the Northern District of
'O1in If, 107 F.3d at 1513.651d.
66See id. (stating that Olin contended Congress sought only to extend liability to persons
who would become owners and operators after the enactment of CERCLA).
6 The court of appeals stated, "[Olin] has pointed to nothing in the statute or its
legislative history which supports this strained view." Id. at 1513.
8Id.
"See, e.g., Cooper Indus. v. Agway, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 92, 103 (N.D.N.Y. 1997);
United States v. Gurley, 43 F.3d 1188 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Northeastern Pharm. &
Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 732-33 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp.
1064, 1073 (D. Colo. 1985); Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300,1310-11 (N.D.
Ohio 1983).
7
"See,e.g., Cooper Indus., 987 F. Supp. at 103; Gurley,43 F.3d at 1188; Northeastern
Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d at 732-33 (stating that the language of the liability provision
makes it "manifestly clear that Congress intended CERCLA to have a retroactive effect.").
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New York decided that the many uses of the past tense in section 107
provide clear indication of CERCLA's retroactive application."
Other courts have found, however, that the past tense does not
provide evidence that Congress clearly intended to apply CERCLA
retroactively. 2 Moreover, at least one defendant has asserted that the
language in section 107 indicates that Congress intended to apply
CERCLA prospectively."
2. CERCLA's Notification Provision
The court of appeals also examined section 103 of CERCLA to
determine whether Congress intended CERCLA to be retroactive.74
Section 103 requires that any person who at the time of disposal owned
or operated a facility at which hazardous substances have been stored,
treated, or disposed shall notify EPA.7" Failure to provide notification
may result in the forfeiture of defenses established under section 107 of
CERCLA.76 The court of appeals asserted that because section 103
requires owners and operators to notify EPA even if the conduct
7 Cooper Indus., 987 F.Supp. at 103. The court made particular note of the fact that
there is no temporal limitation as to the scope of liability provided in section 107. Id. The court
referred to other uses of the past tense in section 107 as emphasis for its conclusion. Id. See also
CERCLA liability provisions that use the past tense ofaverb: § 107(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2),
"any person who ... owned or operated any facility;" § 107(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) "any
person who ... arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter;" and §
107(a)(4),42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) "any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances
for transport to disposal." (emphasis added).
'See, e.g., Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. at 1073 (stating that, "I find and conclude that
[C]ongressional intent to either impose or withhold liability for response costs incurred before
CERCLA cannot be divined from verb tenses in § 107(a)"); Georgeoff 562 F. Supp. at 1310-11.
The Olin district court also reached this conclusion. United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp.
1502, 1513 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
71in UnitedStates v. Shell Oil Co., the defendant asserted that the verb tense in section
107(a)(4) demonstrated that Congress intended the provision to apply prospectively. Shell Oil
Co., 605 F. Supp. at 1073. Section 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1996) provides, "any
person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment
facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a
threatened release ... shall be liable for ... all costs of removal or remedial action...." See also
Summers v. Skibs A/S Myken, 191 F. Supp. 929,930 (E.D. Pa.), afdper curiam, 926 F.2d 548
(3d Cir. 196 1). In these cases, the defendant asserted unsuccessfully that because the word "shall"
applies in the future, Congress intended that the liability provision would apply prospectively. It
is important to note that the term "shall" in section 107(a)(4) applies to all liable parties identified
in section 107(a). In this respect, the defendant's argument applies to retroactive analysis
generally, not only to parties potentially liable under section 107(aX
4).
74United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1513 (1 1th Cir. 1997).
75CERCLA § 103, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(c) (1996).
761d. See supra note 18 and accompanying text regarding available legal defenses to
CERCLA liability.
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occurred prior to CERCLA's enactment, the liability provisions of
section 107 must also apply to preenactment activities." The rationale
is that if persons were not liable for activities that predated CERCLA's
enactment, there would be no reason to withhold use of liability
defenses as penalty for failing to provide proper notice. Although the
court of appeals found these provisions persuasive, other courts have
not considered them dispositive.7"
3. CERCLA's Natural Resource Damage Provisions
The court of appeals also stated that CERCLA's natural
resource damage provisions provide further evidence that Congress
clearly intended to apply the Act retroactively.79 Because the court of
appeals discussed this issue in a footnote, this conclusion appears less
significant than other conclusions the court reached. Section 107(f)80
and section 1 11 (d)"' of CERCLA limit the recovery of natural resource
damages to actions which occurred after CERCLA's enactment.82
Because these provisions are the only provisions in CERCLA that
prohibit retroactive application, it has been asserted that there is a
strong "negative inference" that legislators must have intended to apply
retroactivity everywhere else in the Act. 3 If Congress did not intend
that CERCLA apply retroactively, there would be no reason to include
this specific language. Furthermore, if Congress had wished to limit
1Olin 11, 107 F.3d at 1513.
7 See, e.g., Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Fiberbond Corp., 946 F. Supp. 651 (N.D.
Ind. 1996) (holding that only CERCLA's legislative history provides adequate evidence to apply
CERCLA retroactively).
7901in 11, 107 F.3d at 1513 n.17.
'Section 107(f) provides "[i]n the case of an injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural
resources ... [t]here shall be no recovery ... where such damages and the release of a hazardous
substance from which such damages resulted have occurred wholly before December 11, 1980."
CERCLA § 107(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (1996).
"Section 111 (d) provides, "No money in [Superfund] may be used ... where the injury,
destruction, or loss of natural resources and the release of a hazardous substance from which such
damages resulted have occurred wholly before December 11, 1980." CERCLA § 111 (d), 42
U.S.C. § 961 1(d) (1996).
"Courts have indicated that the purpose of this limitation is to preclude the use of
Superfund money for the clean up of sites that are relatively stable. Because of the limited funds,
Congress preferred to spend Superfund assets on unstable sites, not sites with damaged natural
resources, but which were unlikely to deteriorate further. See Nevada ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v.
United States, 925 F. Supp. 691,702 (D. Nev. 1996); United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp.
1064 (D. Colo. 1985).
"See, e-g., Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. at 1075-76; Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff,
562 F. Supp. 1300, 1311 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
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retroactive application of CERCLA's other provisions, it would have
included specific language as it did for natural resource damages.
The Supreme Court has discredited the use of such negative
inference reasoning. In Landgraf, the petitioner asserted that two
sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provided a strong negative
inference that all sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 applied
retroactively unless the provisions were specifically limited to
prospective application. 4 The Court refused to infer that the statute
was retroactive simply because two statutory provisions created a
negative inference of retroactivity."' The Supreme Court asserted that
it would have been unusual for Congress to define a statute's retroactive
application through negative inference, especially considering the great
burden imposed by retroactivity.86 The district court, in Olin I, relied
on this analysis in support of its decision that CERCLA did not apply
retroactively.87
In Olin H, the court of appeals acknowledged Landgraf but
noted that the Supreme Court did not preclude the use of negative
inference analysis as evidence of retroactive intent.8" The court of
appeals also asserted that, unlike the statutory provisions at issue in
'Scction 402(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides that, "[elxcept as otherwise
specifically provided, this Act and the amendments made by this Act shall take effect upon
enactment." Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 402(a), Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1099
(codified as amended in scattered sections of"2 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). The petitioner asserted that
the introductory clause of section 402(a) would be superfluous unless it referred to section 402(b)
and section 109(c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (both of which provided for prospective
application). Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 258 (1994). Section 402(b) provides
that, "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this Act, nothing in this Act shall apply to any
disparate impact case for which a complaint was filed before March 1, 1975, and for which an
initial decision was rendered after October 30, 1983." Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 402(b), Pub. L.
No. 102-166,105 Stat. 1071, 1099(1991). Section 109(c) provides that, "[tlhe amendments made
by this section shall not apply with respect to conduct occurring before the date of the enactment
of this Act." Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 109(c), Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1078
(1991). According to the petitioner, section 402(b) and section 109(c) of the Civil Rights Act of
1991 represent the other provisions contemplated by the introductory clause of section 402(a) and
together create a strong negative inference that all sections of the Civil Rights Act of 199 1, not
specifically declared prospective, apply to all cases pending before enactment. Landgraf 511 U.S.
at 258.
"5The Supreme Court stated that the petitioner, "places extraordinary weight on two
comparatively minor and narrow provisions in a long and complex statute." Landgraf 511 U.S.
at 258.
"'Id at 259. Retroactive application of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 could have
required the retrying of cases as well as subjecting employers to punitive damages for conduct that
occurred before the provision's enactment. Id.
"United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502, 1509 n.36 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
"United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1513-14 n.17 (1 lth Cir. 1997) (citing
Nevada v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 691, 693 (D. Nev. 1996)).
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Landgraf, the natural resource provisions in CERCLA are closely
connected to the liability provision.89
There are other important differences between the retroactive
implementation of CERCLA and the Civil Rights Act of 1991. When
the Supreme Court limited the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to prospective
application, the Court facilitated the remedial scheme of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 and upheld previous judicial interpretations of the
statute.' Prospective application of CERCLA, on the other hand,
would contravene precedent and would arguably frustrate a purpose of
the Act.9 Furthermore, while the provisions identified in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 are of minor significance in relation to the entire
Act,92 the natural resource damage provisions represent important
sections of CERCLA.93
Although the Eleventh Circuit found this evidence to be
persuasive, courts have varied on whether the language of CERCLA
demonstrates that Congress clearly intended the Act to apply
retroactively.' There is, however, greater judicial consensus that
CERCLA's legislative history provides evidence necessary to satisfy
the Landgraf standard.
"gOlin I, 107 F.3d at 1513-14 n.17. The court of appeals stated, "[u]nlike the
prospective provisions in the 1991 Civil Rights Act ... which were not connected to the specific
provisions that the plaintiff wanted to apply retroactively, liability for response costs, liability for
natural resource damages, and the prospective limitation for natural resource damages are all part
of the same section in CERCLA." Id. (quoting Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Fiberbond Corp.,
946 F. Supp. 651, 659 (ND. Ind. 1996)).
9°See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 259 (stating that purely prospective application of the 1991
Civil Rights Act would prolong the remedial scheme and preserve judicial precedent).
9"CERCLA was enacted to facilitate the cleanup of inactive hazardous substance
disposal sites. Preamble to CERCLA, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767. Limiting CERCLA's
application to post-enactment activities would exempt a large number of defendants from liability
and reduce the amount of funding available for response actions. Although Superfund could pay
for some response actions, Superfund could not pay for all necessary response actions. See infra
notes 155-164 and accompanying text discussing finding appropriated for the Superfund program.
But see Olin 1, 927 F. Supp. at 1518 (indicating that Superfund can pay for preenactment releases
and insufficient funding does not render a statute ineffective).
92See Civil Rights Act of 1991 §§ 109(c), 402(a), (b).
3See Nova Chems., Inc. v. GAF Corp., 945 F. Supp. 1098, 1103 (E.D. Tenn. 1996)
(providing that unlike the minor provisions of the 1991 Civil Rights Act at issue in Landgraf, the
natural resource damage provisions play major roles in the statutory scheme ofCERCLA); Nevada
ex rel Dep't ofTransp. v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 691, 701-02 (D. Nev. 1996) (distinguishing
the negative inference as applied in Landgraf from CERCLA because the "sections of CERCLA
which create liability for response costs ... and damage to natural resources ... are hardly 'minor
and narrow provisions' [as were the provisions at issue in Landgrajl").
'See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986); Chenault v. United States Postal
Service, 37 F.3d 535,538 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1069
(D. Colo. 1985); Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
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C. Legislative History
1. The Legislative Circumstances of CERCLA's Enactment
CERCLA's legislative history provides the most compelling
evidence that courts have found to justify CERCLA's retroactivity.'
This fact remains true even though CERCLA's legislative history has
been widely criticized for its lack of clarity.' The legislative history is
so indefinite, one court stated, that criticizing Congress for the
ambiguities and problems in CERCLA's legislative history was the
judicial equivalent of "shooting fish in a barrel."97
The haste of CERCLA's enactment is one factor contributing
to the unreliability of the legislative history.98 CERCLA was rushed
through Congress in an effort to pass the law before the end of the
9 See Nova Chems., 945 F. Supp. at 1103 (stating that the clearest expression of
Congressional intent to make CERCLA retroactive is revealed in CERCLA's purpose and
legislative history); Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Fiberbond Corp., 946 F. Supp. 651, 660 (N.D.
Ind. 1996) (holding that the legislative history of CERCLA reveals that the clear intent of Congress
was to provide for retroactive application of CERCLA's liability provisions); Nevada ex rel Dep't
of Transp. v. United States, 925 F. Supp. at 695 (same); Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810
F.2d at 733 (stating that the legislative history and statutory scheme confirm CERCLA's
retroactivity).
'See HRW Sys., Inc. v. Washington Gas Light Co., 823 F. Supp. 318, 327 (D. Md.
1993) (declaring that the legislative history of CERCLA cannot support the weight of a legal
determination); Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1221 (3d Cir.
1993) ("Congressional intent may be particularly difficult to discern with precision in CERCLA,
a statute notorious for its lack of clarity and poor draftsmanship"); Riverside Mkt. Dev. Corp. v.
Int'l Bldg. Prods., Inc., 931 F.2d 327, 330 n.3 (5th Cir. 1991) ("CERCLA has acquired a well-
deserved notoriety forvaguely-drafled provisions and an indefinite, if not contradictory, legislative
history.") (quoting United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898,902 (D.N.H. 1985)). See also John
Copeland Nagle, CERCL4's Mistakes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1405 (1997).
"
7
HRW Sys., Inc., 823 F. Supp. at 327 (quoting 1 CERCLA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 10, at 788-89). "The Court will decline the opportunity of taking what amounts here
to a point-blank shot at a stationary target because Representative Harsha has already done the job:
'There are numerous deficiencies as our handout demonstrates. The bill is not even drafted in a
technically sound manner.... We are establishing civil liability and criminal penalties in this
legislation, and numerous questions have been raised as to what we are doing to common law with
this new statute. These are not spurious issues. They are going to be litigated and the courts are
going to have a field day in ridiculing the Congress on passing laws that are vague, internally
inc9nsistent, and using tools such as superseding laws which are in conflict without any further
guidance. This bill is not a superfund bill - it's a welfare and relief act for lawyers."' Id.
9"The district court found that CERCLA's legislative history demonstrates that
legislators agreed to disagree on CERCLA's retroactive application. United States v. Olin Corp.,
927 F. Supp. 1502, 1515 (S.D. Ala. 1996). The district court emphasized that the political
circumstances surrounding the passage of CERCLA prevented its legislative history from being
a reliable source of analysis. Id.
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legislative session.' Haste was so critical that numerous errors existed
in the amended bills introduced before Congress."'0 Under pressure to
approve a version of the legislation, Congress enacted CERCLA
without the extensive review and debating procedures that usually
accompany the legislative process.'0 ' Furthermore, the recorded
legislative history that does exist is an incomplete indication of the
legislature's deliberations.'0 2  Much of the legislative discussion
occurred off-the-record.' 3 Although members of Congress addressed
retroactivity to some degree, these discussions did not take place during
formal floor debates and are largely unrecorded in committee hearing
or bill markup transcripts."0 4
Besides the haste of enactment, Congress enacted CERCLA
under a suspension of rules provision which mandated that the bill
could only be passed without amendment."'0 According to the district
court's analysis, Congress was faced with only two choices: either
reject the bill completely or enact the bill despite its faults."6 Because
CERCLA contained a legislative veto provision that would have
facilitated Congressional amendment to the statute, the circumstances
favored CERCLA's quick enactment.
10 7
'Members of Congress objected to the haste in which the bill was enacted. H.R. 96-
7020, § 3071 (1980), reprinted in 2 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980 (SUPERFUND), SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBUC WORKS, 96th Cong., at 787-89 (1980) [hereinafter
2 CERCLA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
, "Representative Snyder commented, "[O]ur legislative counsel briefly looked at this
bill and found 45 technical errors .... There is no telling how many (errors) he could find if he
got to study it a little bit." Id. at 805.
...Olin1, 927 F. Supp. at 1513-14.
'2See United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823,843 (W.D.
Mo. 1984).
1031d.
1041d. (stating that "it is difficult to believe that if Congress had intended to make the
defendants liable for pre-CERCLA expenses, it would not have said so explicitly and clearly in the
statutory language, committee reports or floor debates"); accord United States v. Wade, 577 F.
Supp. 1326, 1335-36 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
"'See Olin 1, 927 F. Supp. at 1514 (citing FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW Sec. 4A.02[21[a], at 4A-51 (1994) (citations omitted)).
1"Id. at 1515. See also Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 1 (1982) (stating that CERCLA "was considered and passed, after very limited debate,
under a suspension of the rules, in a situation which allowed for no amendments. Faced with a
complicated bill on a take it-or-leave it basis, the House took it, groaning all the way.").
'"7According to the district court, because Congress presumed that revisions could be
easily enacted, legal issues such as retroactivity were left ambiguous under the expectation that
Congress could revisit those issues without concern of a presidential veto. Olin 1, 927 F. Supp.
at 1515. Congressional use of the legislative veto has since been declared unconstitutional. INS
v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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2. Detailed Discussion of the Court of Appeals Decision on
CERCLA's Legislative History
Unlike the district court, which found that CERCLA's
legislative history proves that Congress left many issues undecided,'0 s
the Eleventh Circuit court of appeals determined that CERCLA's
legislative history and legislative structure confirmed that Congress
clearly intended CERCLA to apply retroactively." 9 The court of
appeals asserted that Congress intended that the parties who were
responsible for the disposal would pay the response costs, not the
public."0 The court of appeals referenced CERCLA's legislative
history and statutory structure to support its position."' According to
the court of appeals, because the purpose of the Act can only be
realized through retroactive application of CERCLA, Congress must
have intended CERCLA to be retroactive." 2
The court of appeals cited CERCLA's chief predecessor bill,
Senate Bill 1480,' as evidence of a clear Congressional intent favoring
retroactive application of the Act. The court of appeals claimed that
although Senate Bill 1480 contained no express statement concerning
retroactivity, all Congressional commentators believed that the
proposed statute would apply to preenactment activities."' The court
"°Olin 1, 927 F. Supp. at 1515.
109United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1513-14 (1 th Cir. 1997).
"Id. The court of appeals states, "[a]n essential purpose of CERCLA is to place the
ultimate responsibility for the clean up of hazardous waste on 'those [parties] responsible for
problems caused by the disposal of chemical poison[s]."' Id. at 1514 (quoting Redwing Carriers,
Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1501 (1Ith Cir. 1996)). Numerous other courts have
shared this interpretation. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 174 (4th Cir.
1988); United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 733 (8th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1072 (D. Colo. 1985).
' The court of appeals cited a statement from the Congressional Report providing that
the government only pays response costs "where a liable party does not clean up, cannot be found,
or cannot pay the costs of cleanup." Olin 11, 107 F.3d at 1514 n.18 (quoting I CERCLA
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 320 (Committee Report)). The Senate Report confirms
this Congressional intent. The report states, "[S]ociety should not bear the costs of protecting the
public from hazards produced in the past by a generator [or] transporter ... who has profited or
otherwise benefitted from commerce involving these substances." S. REP. No. 96-848, at 98
(1980). The court of appeals also stated that CERCLA's statutory structure, which lists the
liability provisions "ahead" of the government-funding sections, confirms these priorities. Olin
11, 107 F.3d at 1514 n. 18 (referencing CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1996) and CERCLA
§ I 1, 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1996)). Presumably, by placing the liability provisions before the
funding provisions, Congress intended to emphasize the broad nature of liability.
'2Olin II, 107 F.3d at 1514.
"IS. 1480, 96th Cong. (1979).
"401in II, 107 F.3d at 1514 (citing Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Fiberbond Corp., 946
F. Supp. 651, 662 (N.D. Ind. 1996)).
CERCLA's RETROACTIVITY
of appeals rejected the district court's view that the legislative
discussion related to Senate Bill 1480 carried little influence."
5
According to the court of appeals, the legislative discussion
accompanying Senate Bill 1480 was influential for two reasons. First,
the liability provisions from Senate Bill 1480 were incorporated into
CERCLA." 6 Second, the issues of contention over the passage of
Senate Bill 1480 did not relate to retroactivity, but rather addressed
joint liability, several liability, and personal injury." 7
3. Analysis of Legislative History
The court of appeals failed to address some valid issues raised
in the district court's analysis of legislative history. In particular, the
court of appeals addressed neither CERCLA's absence of an express
provision on retroactivity"' nor why retroactivity was not specifically
discussed in Congressional floor debates." 9  Because these two
elements of the legislative history can be extremely telling, their
absence diminishes the persuasiveness of legal decisions that use
CERCLA's legislative history as proof that Congress intended the
statute to apply retroactively. At a minimum, it is surprising that
retroactivity was unaddressed in these forums considering the perceived
unfairness of retroactive liability. 120 As Landgraf emphasized, one of
..Id See also United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502, 1514 (S.D. Ala. 1996)
(indicating that CERCLA's legislative history provides little valuable insight).
"6See Olin 11, 107 F.3d at 1514 n.20 (comparing S. 1480, § 4(a)(1) with CERCLA §
107(a)(4)(A)-(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(B) (1996)).
"'See Olin 11, 107 F.3d at 1515 (citing statements of Senator Randolf and Senator
Stafford, at 1 CERCLA LEGISLATIVE HISToRY, supra note 10, at 681-96). Butsee George Clemon
Freeman, Jr.,A Public Policy Essay: SuperfundRetroactivity Revisited, 50 Bus. LAw. 663,672-73
n.56-57 and accompanying text (1995) (describing the objections of Senators Domenici, Bentsen,
and Baker regarding retroactive application of S. 1480's liability provisions).
"8lhere is also no provision in CERCLA's implementing regulations that explicitly
provides for retroactive application of the statute. CERCLA's implementing regulations are
provided in the National Contingency Plan (NCP) at 40 C.F.R. Part 300. See also United States
v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726,734 (8th Cit. 1986) (notingthat the NCP does
not expressly provide for retroactive application of CERCLA's liability provision). It has been
asserted that because section 107(a) of CERCLA provides that only costs "not inconsistent" with
the NCP are recoverable, and because the NCP does not specifically address retroactivity, that
recovery of preenactment costs is unjustified. This argument was rejected in UnitedStates v. Shell
Oil Co. on the grounds that section 107(a) addresses the nature of response actions for which costs
can be recovered, not the timing of those actions. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. at 1074.
"See Olin 11, 107 F.3d at 1506.
20See Olin 1, 927 F. Supp. at 1515 (quoting Ohio ex rel Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F.
Supp. 1300,1309 (N.D. Ohio 1983) for the proposition that, "[i]twould have been a simple matter
for Congress to have included a provision within the Act providing that liability would be imposed
retroactively. Given the undoubted Congressional awareness of an existing problem, this omission
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the main reasons for the presumption against retroactivity is to ensure
that Congress evaluated the burdens and benefits associated with
retroactive application of a law."
Notwithstanding the above reasoning, the absence of an express
statement on retroactivity can be interpreted in two ways. As the
district court found, it may imply that Congress did not reach a
consensus on retroactivity but enacted the statute with the issue
unresolved in order to pass the bill before the end of the session.'22 On
the other hand, Congress may have lacked sufficient time to draft 'a
more thorough version of the law that clearly reflected Congressional
consensus on retroactivity. The absence of an express statement on
CERCLA's retroactivity and the lack of a formal legislative discussion
on retroactivity"' may be more of a reflection of time constraints rather
than of Congressional intentions.
Instead ofresponding to the district court's assertions regarding
CERCLA's legislative history, the court of appeals supported its own
conclusions by citing the legislation that preceded CERCLA.'24 The
legislative enactment process of CERCLA's major liability provision,
section 107, is difficult to follow and less conclusive than might be
expected from the legal decisions that have held the enactment process
demonstrates Congress intended CERCLA to apply retroactively. ' On
April 2, 1980, the United States House of Representatives introduced
House Bill 7020.26 This bill provided that responsible parties were
liable for releases of hazardous substances regardless of whether such
releases occurred before, during, or after enactment of the proposed
statute.127 But when House Bill 7020 was reported out of committee for
takes on special importance. There can be no question that Congress was aware that the issue of
retroactivity could arise. Yet, Congress failed to make this statement." See also United States v.
Northeastern Pharrn. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 843 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (stating thai "it is
difficult to believe that if Congress had intended to make the defendants liable for pre-CERCLA
expenses, it would not have said so explicitly and clearly in the statutory language, committee
reports or floor debates."); accord United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1335-36 (E.D. Pa.
1983).
"'See supra note 35 and accompanyingtext regarding the importance of Congressional
deliberation.
"Olin 1, 927 F. Supp. at 1515 (indicating that Congress deliberately deferred many
legal issues because Congress expected the issues would be decided at a later date).
"'Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1311 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
" 4United States v- Olin Corp., 107 F,3d 1506, 1514 (11 th Cir. 1997).
2'See, e.g., Continental Title Co. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 959 F. Supp. 893,
897 (N.D. Ill. 1997); United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 737 (8th
Cir. 1986); United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Colo. 1985).
126H.R. 7020, 96th Cong. (1980).
'2H.R. 7020, § 5.
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Senate review, the committee members had removed its former
provision on retroactivity. 2 This bill was then sent to the Senate for
review.
The Senate passed Senate Bill 1480 instead of the House
legislation. 129  Senate Bill 1480 lacked an express provision on
retroactivity.13 Nonetheless, when Senate Bill 1480 went before the
Committee on Environment and Public Works, Senator Domenici
expressed concern over the retroactive reach of the proposed law. 3 '
Senator Domenici and the Committee members, therefore, included an
amendment that limited the retroactive reach of several liability
provisions' but did not affect the retroactive reach of response cost
liability.'33 The Senate Report, and Senator Domenici himself,
indicated that the amendment did not affect liability for the costs
associated with removal actions. 34 The amendment lacked any express
statement on retroactivity, butjudicial interpretation has concluded that
the amendment operated retroactively through "negative implication."'
This version of the bill was reported out of the Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works on July 11, 1980, and out of the
Committee on Finance on November 18, 1980.136
After review, the Senate rejected this version of the legislation
and instead introduced Amendment No. 2631.137 Like all the earlier
versions of the statute, Amendment No. 2631 lacked an express
12'Continental Title Co., 959 F. Supp. at 897.
'Id.; I CERCLA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 774-75.
3'S. 1480, 96th Cong. § 4 (1980).
']Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. at 1077 (citing Transcript of Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works, Mark-up Session of S 1480, June 26-27, 1980). On this basis,
it appears that these Committee members assumed that the bill operated retroactively.
"2Senator Domenici's modifying amendment, section 4(n), precluded the retroactive
reach of some liability provisions, and limited the retroactive reach of other liability provisions to
January 1, 1977. Continental Title Co., 959 F. Supp. at 897.
'33The amendment provided that no person may recover for specified damages or for
the release ofhazardous substances, from which such specified damages resulted, which occurred
before enactment of the Act. S. 1480,96th Cong. § 4(n)(l) (1980). Those damages included, but
were not limited to, expenses associated with injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources
and real or personal property. Id. § 4(a)(2).
'Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works Report, S. Doc. No. 96-848
at 37 (July 11, 1980). Senator Domenici commented that the costs of temporary and permanent
relocation of residences shall be considered costs of removal, and therefore, are "not affected by
the retroactive limitation." Transcript of Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works
Mark-Up Session of S. 1480, 194-95, June 26, 1980.
"'Continental Title Co., 959 F. Supp at 897 n.4. Presumably, the amendment operated
retroactively because there was a limit on its retroactive effect.
1161 CERCLA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 305, 344-45, 462, 499-501,
'"Id. at 560-775. See also 126 CONG. REC. S30,916 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980)
(discussing Amendment No. 2631).
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statement regarding the retroactive liability of response costs."'
Because the language between Senate Bill 1480 and Amendment No.
2631 is so similar,139 courts have concluded that the Congressional
intent on response cost liability was retained. 4 The Senate and House
passed this latest version ofSenate Bill 1480 which the President signed
on December 11, 1980.141 As such, courts have relied on the
assumptions associated with the original version of Senate Bill 1480 as
proof that Congress intended to apply CERCLA retroactively.142
After reviewing the series of legislative amendments, it is
difficuitto conclude thatthe process demonstrates that Congress clearly
intended CERCLA to apply retroactively. To hold otherwise requires
that one rely on a series of compounded assumptions (many of which
are unexpressed) made during the legislative process. Moreover, all of
these assumptions are based on the original assumption made by the
few members of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Works.
There are several reasons why the amendment 'process, by
itself, does not demonstrate that Congress clearly intended to apply
CERCLA retroactively. Even though members of the Senate
Committee on Environment and Public Works understood their
"'The amendment did, however, provide that liability for natural resource damages was
only prospective. 1 CERCLALEGIsLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 560-775; Continental Title
Co., 959 F. Supp. at 898; CERCLA § 107,42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1996).
"'Amendment No. 2631 is clearly based on section 4(n) of S. 1480. See Continental
Title Co., 959 F. Supp. at 898-99 (providing a line-by-line comparison of section 4(n) with
Amendment 2631 as enacted by CERCLA). The main differences between Amendment No. 2631
and section 4(n) are their treatment of economic loss, personal injury, loss of income, and out-of-
pocket medical expenses. Id. at 898.
"4'See Continental Title Co., 959 F. Supp. at 898-99 (concluding that Congress' intent
to impose retroactive liability for response cost remained unchanged). The court cited provisions
from the legislative record indicating that Senator Domenici's amendment, upon which CERCLA
appears to have been based, did not alter the retroactive application of the statute's liability
provision. Id.
14ld. at 897.
r4"The Senate legislative process upon which the courts have relied upon to prove
CERCLA's retroactivity proceeds as follows: (1) S. 1480 is proposed; (2) Senator Domenici
amends section 4 of S. 1480 because the Senator wanted to limit retroactive application of the
statute (the Senator's amendment did not affect retroactive liability for response costs); (3) Senator
Domenici's amendment is amended by Amendment No. 2631 (which does not alter the Senator's
vision of retroactive liability for response costs); and (4) Amendment No. 2631 is enacted. Thus,
courts have actually relied on the original version of S. 1480 which does not provide any express
statement on retroactive liability, but which the Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Works believed to allow for retroactive liability. One court provides, "the sum of this analysis is
that the drafters of S. 1480, from which CERCLA's liability scheme derived, clearly intended it
to apply retroactively, as was brought out in Senator Domenici's attempts to limit this reach."
Continental Title Co., 959 F. Supp. at 900.
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assumptions regarding the original version of Senate Bill 1480, it is
unlikely that these assumptions would have been apparent to other
legislators. Because there is no explicit statement in the text of
CERCLA and there were no legislative floor debates specifically on
retroactivity, it is impossible to confirm that other members of Congress
knew that the Senate Committee presumed the bill would operate
retroactively. The speculations courts have used to justify retroactivity
based on the series of CERCLA amendments represent an unreliable
basis upon which to apply retroactivity. Post hoc efforts to impute
Congressional intent are easily misguided because the intent of each
member of Congress and the President may vary.
Moreover, even if it was possible to accurately determine the
reason why particular provisions were included, those reasons may not
be reflected in the actual law. It is the text of the law that must be
complied with, not the reasons behind the law.'43 The fact that
Congress enacted CERCLA under severe time constraints, under a
suspension of rules, without extensive legislative debate, and without
clear consensus' 44 provides further justification for not attempting to
divine what each legislator intended.145 While it is permissible to use
legislative intent to assist in implementation of a statute, as the district
court noted, it is impermissible to use legislative intent to read new
provisions into a statute.
46
"See In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that courts "do not
inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means") (quoting Oliver Wendell
Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 417-418 (1899)); Nagle,
supra, note 96, at 1429.
'"Evidence in the record indicates that there was little consensus among the lawmakers.
Senator Baker, the Minority Leader of the Senate, stated that "this compromise is a fragile thing."
126 CONG. REc. 30,916 (1980). Senators stated it would be impossible to pass the bill again, even
unchanged. Congress Clears "Superfund" Legislation, 36 CoNG. Q. ALMANAC, 584, 593 (1980).
Senator Randolf, Chairman of the Committee on Environment and Public Works, also
acknowledged considerable opposition to the Senate's legislative approach. 126 CONG. REC.
30,932 (1980). This opposition was reflected in the voting counts (the House vote on CERCLA
was 274 to 94) and it has been asserted that the voting counts do not even adequately reflect the
amount of conflict over the bill. Nagle, supra, note 96, at 1441. It has been asserted, however,
that this lack of consensus did not relate to the retroactive application of CERCLA's liability
provisions. United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1514 (11 th Cir. 1997). This assertion
may be faulted for two reasons; not only was there insufficient time for comprehensive debate on
retroactivity, but much of the debate that did take place was not covered in the legislative history.
"'See United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 59 F.3d 584, 588 (6th Cir.) (stating that
it is difficult to divine the specific goals of Congress with respect to CERCLA liability since the
statute represents an eleventh hour compromise), vacated and reh "g en banc granted, 67 F.3d 586
(6th Cir. 1995).
'"United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502, 1515 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
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III. OUTSTANDING ISSUES REGARDING CERCLA'S RETROACTIVE
APPLICATION
A. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
Although the issue is unaddressed in the Olin decisions, other
courts analyzing CERCLA's retroactivity have recognized that one of
the major purposes behind CERCLA's enactment was to fill the
regulatory loopholes left by the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA).'47 RCRA was enacted four years before CERCLA and
provides a comprehensive regulatory system to control the entire
hazardous waste life cycle.'48
After RCRA's enactment, it became apparent that RCRA's
prospective focus failed to protect against preexisting disposal sites of
hazardous substances. During the late 1970s, scientists began to better
appreciate that even after hazardous substances were buried, the
substances could percolate through the soil, infiltrate groundwater
tables, and persist over long periods of time.149
Several courts have used these facts as evidence that CERCLA
should be applied retroactively." These courts have generally
reasoned that in determining the proper implementation of a statute, it
is important to evaluate the statute in light of other laws'' and the
historical context of the statute's enactment.'52 Because CERCLA's
legislative record indicates that Congress intended that CERCLA
address the inactive hazardous substance sites left unaddressed by
14742 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1996).
14See id.
""United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1070-71 (D. Colo. 1985).
'"See, e.g., id. at 1071; United States v. Northeastern Pharm & Chem. Co., 579 F.
Supp. 823, 839 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1252
(S.D. III. 1984); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1109 (D.N.J. 1983).
"'See United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064,1070 (D. Colo. 1985) (stating
that CERCLA must be construed in light of previous statutes relating to environmental pollution);
2A 1. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 48.03 (5th ed. 1992) (stating
that "[tlhe legal history of a statute, including prior statutes on the same subject, is a valuable
guide for determining what object an act is supposed to achieve. Other statutes on a subject,
previous to or contemporary with enactment of the statute being construed, may also be helpful.").
'See Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247 (1953); United
States v. Ruzicka, 329 U.S. 287 (1946); 2A J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 151, § 48.03 (5th ed,
1992) (supporting the evaluation of historical information). "It is the established practice in
American legal processes to consider relevant information concerning the historical background
of enactment in making decisions about how a statute is to be construed and applied. This would
especially true where ... the statutory language is inadequate or unclear. These extrinsic aids may
show the circumstances under which the statute was passed, the mischief at which it was aimed
and the object it was supposed to achieve .. " Id.
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RCRA, t5 a it may be asserted that proper realization of CERCLA's
purpose would require retroactive implementation.
The main argument against this line of reasoning is that
CERCLA's purpose can still be fulfilled without the statute's
retroactive application. Even if CERCLA's purpose is to address
regulatory loopholes left by RCRA, it does not follow that Congress
intended former owners and operators to be held liable for those
response costs. This argument may be less persuasive after evaluating
the amount of government funding made available for CERCLA
response costs."'4
B. The Hazardous Substance Superfund
Another issue courts have considered in determining whether
CERCLA should be applied retroactively is the amount of money
Congress allocated to the Hazardous Substance Superfund
(Superfund). 1' This fund provides money for response costs in
situations where responsible parties cannot be located or where there
are insufficient funds available for cleanup." 6
At the time ofCERCLA's enactment, Congress understood that
CERCLA-related environmental cleanup expenses greatly exceeded the
amount of money in Superfund.' 57 Although Superfund had $1.6 billion
available for cleanup, the costs associated with responding to all the
"'See Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Fiberbond Corp., 946 F. Supp. 651, 661 (N.D.
Ind. 1996) (stating that "It]he debates and reports on the bills are clear that in enacting CERCLA
Congress was responding to the problem posed by existing inactive waste dump sites."). The court
declared that RCRA regulated the future dumping of waste, but did not provide authority to deal
with existing dump sites where disposal had taken place before RCRA. Id. See also I CERCLA
LEGIsLATivE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 235-36 (remarks by Representative Madigan during the
House debate on H.R. 7020 on September 19, 1980) (stating, "as many of us... recognized early
on, there was definitely a gap in existing law in dealing with abandoned or orphan dump sites").
Senator Gore also commented, "The prospective dumping will be addressed in a regulatory
program to take effect later this fall pursuant to the mandate of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act. What we are addressing [in] this legislation is the dumping that occurred in the
past." id at 239 (remarks by Senator Gore during House debate on H.R. 7020 on September 19,
1980).
"4See infra notes 155-164 and accompanying text (discussing funding appropriated to
the Superfund program).
"Superfund was established pursuant to section 111 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9611
(1996).
tm6Superfund provides money to pay for government response costs and claims for
necessary response costs incurred by any other person as a result of carrying out the provisions of
the NCP. CERCLA § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1996).
"7See Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1313 (N.D. Ohio 1983);
CONo. REC. H9176 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1980) (remarks of Representative Brown); id. at S. 14,967
(daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (remarks of Senator Stafford).
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contaminated sites existing in 1980 were between $7 and $44 billion. 1s
Obviously, the $1.6 billion fund, by itself, was insufficient to pay for all
the response costs needed at the time of CERCLA' s enactment.
This fact may indicate that Congress must have intended to
hold responsible parties liable for preenactment releases; otherwise it
would be impossible to accomplish CERCLA's purpose. The
persuasiveness of this argument is reinforced by the fact that Congress
did not anticipate that Superfund would be depleted. Rather, Congress
intended Superfund to provide an ongoing revolving fund capable of
long-term future use.'59 Without the money generated through
retroactive liability, the CERCLA program would begin operations
billions of dollars short of its expected operating costs. Although no
appellate courts have addressed the funding issue, at least one district
court has considered it persuasive. 6
This funding issue may have taken on a new importance since
the Landgraf decision. Landgraf established that the presumption
against retroactivity is rebutted when failure to apply a statute
retroactively would render the law ineffective.' 6' It may be argued that
CERCLA would be rendered ineffective without retroactive application
because if defendants are not liable for preenactment activities,
CERCLA's cleanup program would be too debt-ridden to accomplish
its purpose of cleaning up preexisting contaminated sites.
There are several responses that can, however, be raised in
opposition to this line of reasoning. First, Landgraf also established
that the presumption against retroactivity is not rebutted when
retroactive application of a statute would merely vindicate the statute's
purposes more fully.6 2 The Supreme Court reasoned that Congress
seldom enacts a statute for a single purpose and compromises necessary
"8Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. at 1313. At that time, it was estimated that response costs
would average approximately $3 million at each site. Congress referred to the $3 million estimate
throughout the legislative history. Id.
111d.; Note, Generator Liability Under Superfund for Clean-up of Abandoned
Hazardous Waste Dumpsites, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1229, 1232 (1982).
"°Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. at 1313 -14 (concluding that based on the amount offfunding
allocated to the CERCLA program, Congress must have intended that CERCLA apply
retroactively).
"
6 Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 286 (1994). See also id. at 272-74
(discussing situations where a statutory provision must be retroactive because a contrary reading
would render the statute ineffective). Read broadly, the Supreme Court's discussion may indicate
that even if Congressional intent is unclear, a statute must apply retroactively ifa contrary reading
would render it ineffective.
1111d. at 285-86.
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for enactment may require the inclusion of provisions which undercut
the statute's objectives.'
Second, it is not uncommon that federal programs lack
sufficient funding. As the Olin district court commented, insufficient
funding does not make a statute retroactive, and courts cannot replace
the law that Congress clearly intended with law that is desirable.'
64
Considering that Congress enacted CERCLA hastily and with minimal
legislative review, it should not be surprising that implementation
difficulties have surfaced.
C. CERCLA's Effective Date Clause
Courts have also evaluated section 302(a) of CERCLA as
evidence in support of, and in opposition to, the retroactive application
ofCERCLA.161 Section 302 provides that, "unless otherwise provided,
all provisions of this chapter shall be effective on December 11,
1980.'
,166
Proponents of CERCLA's retroactive application have argued
that using the date of CERCLA's enactment as a point of reference, the
past actions referred to in CERCLA must apply to conduct that
occurred before December 11, 1980.167 Put another way, the date
identified in section 302 merely provides the time after which legal
actions for former conduct can be brought. This analysis adheres to the
rule of statutory interpretation which dictates that, whenever possible,
a statute must be constructed so that every word has operative effect.'
6
On the other hand, section 302 has been a basis that the Act
should only be applied prospectively. In NinthAvenue Remedial Group
..Id. at 286. For example, ifa legislator, whose vote was necessary for enactment of
a bill, opposed retroactive application of a statute, the proponents of the bill might eliminate
retroactivity in order to secure the legislator's support (even if this compromise undermined some
of the statute's objectives).
'"United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502, 1518 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
"6'See, e.g., Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Fiberbond Corp., 946 F. Supp. 651 (N.D.
Ind. 1996); United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 732-33 (8th Cir.
1986); United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1075 (D. Colo. 1985).
1-CERCLA § 302(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9652 (1996).
"6Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d at 732-33 (establishing that December
11, 1980 represents the effective date indicating when an action can first be brought and when the
time begins to run for issuing regulations and performing other future-oriented functions identified
in the statute). See also Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. at 1075 (same).
'"See United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992) (reinforcing the settled
rule that a statute must, if possible, be construed in such fashion that every word has some
operative effect); United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538 (1955) (same),
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v. Fiberbond Corp.,69 the defendant asserted that because section 302
replaced a clause in a bill prior to CERCLA which provided for
retroactive application, Congress must have intended to prevent
CERCLA' s retroactivity.'70 The court rejected the argument by holding
that the omission of the retroactivity clause was insufficient evidence
to indicate that Congress clearly intended the statute to apply
prospectively.' 7
D. Fundamental Fairness
Courts have also considered whether retroactive application of
CERCLA's liability provisions violates fundamental issues of fairness
and substantive due process rights. This issue does not implicate
whether Congress intended CERCLA to apply retroactively, but the
issue addresses whether it is constitutional to apply CERCLA
retroactively. It may be asserted that, because defendants complied
with applicable environmental requirements at the time of disposal, it
is unlawful to hold them liable for previous disposal activities.
Such arguments have generally failed on the grounds that
CERCLA's liability scheme is rationally related to a valid legislative
purpose.'73  Judicial precedent has established that although a
defendant's activities may have been lawful at the time of disposal, it
is not unjust to force a defendant to pay for later CERCLA response
activities.7 4 This conclusion may be bolstered by the fact that the risks
to human health and welfare associated with the disposal of hazardous
"~
9
Ninth Ave. Remedial Group, 946 F. Supp. at 651.
"'O1d. at 657.
' 1d. at 658. The court noted that other cases have also determined that an effective
date clause is meaningless in interpreting Congressional intent with regard to the application of
a statute. Id. at 657. See also Moore v. Califano, 633 F.2d 727, 732 (6th Cir. 1980) (indicating
that the effective date provision is inconclusive on the question ofretroactivity); Jensen v. GulfOil
Ref. & Mktg. Co., 623 F.2d 406, 409 (5th Cir. 1980) (same). But see Landgrafv- US! Film Prods-,
511 U S. 244, 256 (1994) (finding that omitted language on retroactivity represents an indication
of a Congressional intent to eliminate a retroactive command); id. at 288 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(finding that an effective date clause creates a presumption of a prospective effect).
'See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 173-74 (4th Cir. 1988).
'
73
See United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 734 (8th Cir.
1986) (providing thatthe cleanup ofcomaminated disposal sites is a legitimate legislative purpose
and Congress acted rationally in imposing liability for the cost of cleaning up such sites upon the
parties that profited from the sites and the chemical industry as a whole); Monsanto, 858 F.2d at
173; United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1984).
'
14
See, e.g., Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., Inc., 810 F.2d at 734; Monsanto Co.,
858 F.2d at 173.
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substances, and the potential need to address those risks, were
foreseeable at the time of the earlier disposal activities.'75
The Supreme Court has also established that retroactive
application of a statute may be justified in order to disperse economic
hardships. In Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., the Supreme Court
held that retroactive application of the Black Lung Benefits Act of
1972176 did not violate due process.' The Supreme Court established
that a presumption of constitutionality attaches to legislation that
readjusts economic burdens and benefits. 7 ' The Supreme Court
reasoned that even though the Black Lung Benefits Act imposed new
liability on preenactment activities, retroactive application was a
justifiable means of spreading the cost of disabilities to persons who
had profited from former activities. 1
79
The same reasoning that the Supreme Court used in Usery may
be applied to CERCLA liability. By holding responsible parties liable
for preenactment activities, CERCLA spreads response costs among the
parties that most profited from activities associated with the disposed
hazardous substances.
It can be argued, however, that the public has also received a
substantial benefit from activities associated with the disposed
hazardous substances through the availability of consumer products
whose creation required use of hazardous substances. As such, the
public should contribute some of the funding (raised through taxes)
required to support government response actions focused on the cleanup
of contaminated sites created before the enactment of CERCLA.
Regardless of the persuasiveness of this argument, the assertion is more
of a legislative policy decision rather than an issue to be decided by the
judiciary.'
'Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d at 174.
"76Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-303, 86 Stat. 150 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
'-428 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1976).
'781d. at 15. The Court noted that the burden of proving that the law is arbitrary and
irrational falls on the claimant. Id.
1191d. at 18. The Court stated that the imposition of new liability for disabilities
developed prior to the Black Lung Benefits Act was "justified as a rational measure to spread the
costs of the employees' disabilities to those who have profited from the fruits of [the employees']
labor." Id. The Court stated, "[Liegislation readjusting rights and burdens is not unlawful solely
because it upsets otherwise settled expectations. This is true even though the effect of the
legislation is to impose a new duty or liability based on past acts." Id. at 16 (citations omitted).
"WIn addition, the assertion can be criticized in that the responsible parties (owners,
operators, arrangers, and generators of hazardous substances) derived a disproportionate share of
the benefits associated with hazardous substances. These parties benefitted from the profits
derived from the sale and use of hazardous substances, as well as the availability of the ultimate
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IV. INTERPRETATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. Although Courts Agree That CERCLA Is Retroactive, Courts
Disagree on the Evidence Supporting Retroactivity
The Olin district court opinion represented an anomaly in
CERCLA caselaw. No case before or after" the district court opinion
has held that CERCLA cannot be applied retroactively. This fact does
not, however, indicate that the district court reached legal conclusions
contrary to all judicial interpretations of CERCLA that preceded or
followed the district court's analysis. In fact, many of the district
court's conclusions have been shared by other courts.'82 The difference
is that the district court, unlike all other courts, was not persuaded by
any of the arguments supporting retroactivity.1
8 3
There is judicial disagreement on whether the language of
CERCLA indicates that Congress clearly intended that CERCLA apply
retroactively. Cases before and after the Olin decisions have differed
on the evidentiary value of the statutory language.'" Moreover, even
among the courts finding that the statutory language provides a clear
indication that the statute should be applied retroactively, those courts
vary in concluding which statutory provisions demonstrate the required
consumer products.
"'Cases, after Olin 11, that have addressed retroactivity include: Nova Chems., Inc. v.
GAF Corp., 945 F. Supp. 1098 (E.D. Tenn. 1996); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., No.
87-CV-920, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16358, (N.D.N.Y. October 28, 1996); Cooper Indus. v.
Agway, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 92 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Fibrbond Corp.,
946 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Ind. 1996); Gould, Inc. v. A & M Battery & Tire Serv., 933 F. Supp. 431
(M.D. Pa. 1996); and Nevada ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 691 (D. Nev.
1996).
"'See infra notes 184-192 and accompanying text discussing conclusions that previous
courts have shared with the Olin district court.
"'See United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502, 1512-19 (S.D. Ala. 1996)
(evaluating the evidence that previous courts have used to justify CERCLA's retroactive
application).
'"See, e.g., Nova Chems., Inc., 945 F. Supp. 1098 (stating that CERCLA's language
does not determine that Congress clearly intended to apply CERCLA retroactively); Cooper Indus.,
987 F. Supp. 92 (holding that CERCLA's language provides clear evidence of a Congressional
intent to applyCERCLA retroactively); NinthAve. RemedialGroup, 946 F. Supp. 651 (indicating
that CERCLA's language does not establish that Congress clearly intended to apply CERCLA
retroactively); United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 733 (8th Cir.
1986) (providing that CERCLA's language and statutory scheme demonstrate a clear congressional
intent to apply CERCLA retroactively); United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1065 (D.
Colo. 1985) (stating that CERCLA's language does not determine that Congress clearly intended
to apply CERCLA retroactively).
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Congressional intent."8 5 Some courts have focused on the use of the
past tense in section 107 as an indication of Congress' intent to apply
CERCLA retroactively.8 6 Other courts have found that the past tense
is not dispositive, but the natural resource provisions clearly indicate
the statute should be applied retroactively."8 7 The one area of general
agreement is that the effective date clause does not, by itself,
demonstrate that Congress clearly intended CERCLA to apply
retroactively.'
The most frequently cited evidence that courts have used to
justify CERCLA's retroactive application is its legislative history.
There is, however, little judicial consensus on what elements in the
legislative history establish CERCLA's retroactivity. Courts have
focused on the amount of money that Congress appropriated to
Superfund,'"9 the series of legislative amendments altering liability,'"
and the purpose of the Act.'9 ' At least one court has found that all three
elements provide clear evidence that Congress intended the liability
provisions to apply retroactively.' 92
"uCompare AlcanAluminum Corp., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16358, at *7 (stating that
the language of section 107 makes it clear that Congress intended CERCLA to be applied
retroactively) with Nevada ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. United States, 925 F. Supp. at 702 (holding
that the natural resource provisions clearly indicate that Congress intended CERCLA to apply
retroactively).
'"E.g., Alcan Aluminum Corp., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16358, at *7 (stating that the
language of section 107 clearly indicates that Congress intended CERCLA to be applied
retroactively). See supra notes 64-73 and accompanying text discussing the use of the past tense
in CERCLA.
'"E.g, Nevada ex rel. Dept. of Transp. v. United States, 925 F. Supp. at 702 ; Shell Oil
Co., 605 F. Supp. at 1076. See supra notes 80 and 81, regarding the language of CERCLA §
107(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(0 (1996) and CERCLA § 111 (d), 42 U.S.C. § 961 l(d) (1996).
"See supra note 171 and accompanying text (dismissing the significance of the
effective date clause in determining CERCLA's retroactive application).
'"E.g., Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1312-14 (N.D. Ohio
1983).
"wE.g., Continental Title Co. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 959 F. Supp. 893,897-
98 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Fiberbond Corp., 946 F. Supp. 651 , 664 (N.D.
Ind. 1996).
"'.E.g, Cooper Indus. v. Agway, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 92 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that
because Congress wanted to cleanup inactive and abandoned contaminated sites and have the
responsible parties pay for that cleanup, Congress clearly intended that CERCLA be applied
retroactively); Nevada ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. United States, 925 F. Supp. at 702 (noting that
CERCLA was designed to fill the regulatory gaps left by RCRA and clean up inactive sites).
"'Nevada ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. United States, 925 F. Supp. at 691.
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B. The Olin District Court Decision Presented a Unique Set of
Circumstances for CERCLA's Retroactive Analysis
To rebut the presumption against retroactivity, a court must find
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Congress clearly intended to
apply the statute retroactively.'93 In light of the exacting nature of this
requirement, it raises an issue of how so many courts can review the
same evidence, reach different interpretations, and yet still conclude
that the evidence demonstrates that Congress clearly intended to apply
CERCLA retroactively. If the evidence was as clear as the standard
requires, it seems that there would be more consistency within the
judicial analysis.
Despite this issue, the Olin district court is still the only court
to find that CERCLA cannot be applied retroactively. There may be
two major reasons for this fact. First, the doctrine of stare decisis may
have discouraged contrary interpretations. 94 After fifteen years of
CERCLA caselaw, defense attorneys would be more reluctant to
vigorously assert an argument that has lost in several previous cases
knowing thatjudges would be hesitant to depart from precedent. While
this point may be true for most judges, the judge in the Olin district
court case has demonstrated a willingness to depart from CERCLA
precedent when the precedent diverges from the actual text of the
statute. 95
"'Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 272-73 (1994).
"9The doctrine of stare decisis requires courts to reach analogous conclusions when
presented with the same or substantially similar issues in subsequent cases with different parties.
The doctrine promotes consistency, fairness, and predictability within the law. Jolly, Inc. v.
Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 676 A.2d 831 (Conn. 1996). See also Restifo v. McDonald, 230 A.2d
199, 204 (1967) ("there will be no equal justice under law if a negligence rule is applied in the
morning but not in the afternoon. Stare decisis provides some moorings so that men may trade
and arrange their affairs with confidence. Stare decisis serves to take the capricious element out
of law and to give stability to a society.") (Bell, J., dissenting) (quoting William 0. Douglas, Stare
Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 735, 736 (1949)); Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition,
99 YALE L.J. 1029, 1038-39 (1990) (explaining that stare decisis increases the sum of social
welfare by enhancing the law's predictability, economizing judicial resources, and strengthening
the prestige of legal institutions).
'The judge in the Olin district court decision also recently diverged from CERCLA
precedent in Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 875 F. Supp. 1545 (S.D. Ala. 1995).
In that case, the judge held that the plain language of CERCLA requires that a party both own and
operate a facility in order to be liable under section 107(a)(1). This holding differed from previous
cases which determined that Congress meant to hold an owner or an operator liable; Congress did
not intend that a party must meet both qualifications in order to incur liability. This decision was
reversed, in part, on appeal. See Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489
(llth Cir. 1996). It may also be important to note that the judge has criticized the role and
authority of administrative agencies. See supra note 25 (regarding the Olin district court judge's
statements concerning administrative agencies). It is unclear whether this viewpoint may have
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In addition to the particular judge assigned to hear the issues in
the Olin district court case, the timing of the Landgraf decision may
have also contributed to the outcome of the lower court opinion.
Landgraf provided important guidance on retroactive analysis which
reflected directly on the analysis previously used to justify CERCLA's
retroactive application. The Supreme Court decided Landgrafshortly
before the Olin district court decision,1" and the Olin district court was
the first court to squarely address CERCLA's retroactive application
after Landgraf.97 The combination of the unique legal circumstances,
along with the particular judge selected for the case, may have
precipitated the district court's holding.
C. The Totality of Evidence Demonstrates That Congress Clearly
Intended CERCLA to Apply Retroactively
Although the Olin district court decision is the only decision to
hold that CERCLA is not retroactive, it is apparent that courts have
struggled with the implementation and interpretation of CERCLA. g8
In their attempts to implement CERCLA' s general requirements, courts
have been obligated to solve ambiguities present in the statute's text
and legislative history."9 This has resulted in inconsistent judicial
analysis which is perpetuated by the doctrine of stare decisis. This fact,
however, does not demonstrate that the cases which have addressed
CERCLA's retroactivity have established a completely improper legal
precedent.
Contrary to the district court's holding, the evidence supporting
retroactivity is present in the text and legislative history. Previous legal
decisions have been too eager, however, to find clear evidence in those
sources. Some decisions analyzing the evidence supporting CERCLA's
contributed to the outcome of the case.
"'The Olin district court decision was issued on May 20, 1996. The Supreme Court
decided Landgrafon April 26, 1994.
"United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502, 1507 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
'"Numerous courts have indicated that CERCLA's legislative history is difficult to
interpret. See, e.g., United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H. 1985) (stating that
"CERCLA has acquired a well-deserved notoriety forvaguely-drafied provisions and an indefinite,
if not contradictory, legislative history."); CP Holdings, Inc. v. Goldberg-Zoino & Assocs., Inc.,
769 F. Supp. 432, 435 (D.N.H. 1991).
'"In their attempts to fill in these gaps, courts have criticized CERCLA as being poorly
drafted legislation. See, e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1989); Roe
v. Wert, 706 F. Supp. 788, 792 (W.D. Okla. 1989); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms
Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1080 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331
(E.D. Pa. 1983).
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retroactivity have relied upon single pieces of evidence which do not
satisfy the exacting criteria outlined in Landgraf For example, the post
hoc efforts that manufacture clear legislative intent from the series of
unaddressed legislative amendments do not fulfill the standards
required to overcome the presumption against retroactivity. Without
maintaining the strict standards required to apply a law retroactively,
courts replace the law that Congress established with law that courts
find desirable. It is not the judiciary's prerogative to repair
inconsistencies within the Act.
200
After an independent review of all the evidence used to
illustrate Congress' intent on CERCLA's retroactive application, it
appears that no evidence in the statute's language or the legislative
history, by itself, provides sufficient evidence to rebut the traditional
presumption against retroactivity. If a piece of evidence, taken in
isolation, was as demonstrative as the legal standard requires, there
would be more uniformity in the judicial analysis. The totality of all
the evidence does, however, justify retroactive application of the
statute. The combination of: (1) the use of the past tense in section
107(a)(1); (2) the notification provision; (3) the natural resource
provisions; (4) the effective date clause; (5) the amendment process; (6)
the legislative purpose; and, (7) the funding appropriated for the
Superfund program demonstrate a clear Congressional intent to apply
CERCLA retroactively. Only the combination of all this circumstantial
evidence justifies a rebuttal of the presumption against retroactivity.
D. The Olin Court of Appeals Decision May Galvanize Legislative
Efforts to Eliminate CERCLA's Retroactive Liability
In response to perceived unfairness associated with the
retroactive application of CERCLA's liability provisions, there has
been great interest in a broad legislative reconstruction of the Act.
There have been several legislative efforts to reauthorize CERCLA, and
the repeal of its retroactivity has been one of the most controversial
issues associated with CERCLA reauthorization.2"' In light of the Olin
court of appeals decision, any changes to CERCLA's applicability to
preenactment activities must occur through the legislative process, as
"See United States v. USX Corp., 68 F.3d 811 (3rd Cir. 1995) (stating that it is not
thejudiciary's prerogative to resolve the inconsistencies that permeate CERCLA).
2"1See Carney, Badley, Smith, & Spellman, Update on Superfund Reform, WASH.
ENVTL. COMPLIANCE UPDATE, Vol. 3, No. 5, Nov. 1996 (describing political disagreements over
the prospect of reforming CERCLA's retroactive application).
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CERCLA's retroactive application will not be eliminated through the
judiciary.
Congressional repeal of CERCLA's retroactivity, in the near
future, appears unlikely. Previous attempts to repeal its retroactivity
have been met with determined opposition from environmentalists, as
well as state governments that rely on the current liability scheme to
pay for response costs.2 2 Moreover, because there has been strong
disagreement over the extent of necessary changes to CERCLA, any
reform effort will encounter some degree of opposition. 3
If Congress reaches an agreement on changes to CERCLA's
retroactive application, it is more likely that the changes will take the
form of specific exemptions to CERCLA liability rather than a
universal repeal of retroactive liability.2" For example, there have been
recent alterations to the liability of financial lenders,"' and there is
considerable interest in reducing the liability of small businesses and
municipalities."s The Clinton Administration has indicated that it
strongly opposes the repeal of retroactive liability but has expressed a
willingness to reduce liability for small volume contributors.2 7 In light
of the reversal of the Olin district court decision, it appears that
retroactivity will continue to be the general standard of liability, but
specific categories of responsible parties may be exempted from the
liability associated with preenactment activities through the political
process.
'. Nagle, supra note 96, at 1454; Jennifer Silverman, Superfund: Both Sides ofLiability
Issue to Testify Before Oxley Panel, Env't Rep. (BNA), Oct. 26, 1995.
' 3Bowker, supra note 6 (describing the opposing positions on CERCLA reauthorization
taken by the Clinton Administration and the business community); Superfund: House Democrats'
Letter to GOP Continues to Fault Oxley's Bill, Negotiations, Env't Rep. (BNA), June 24, 1996;
Superfund Talks Break Down, SUPERFUND WEEK, Vol. 11, No. 31, Aug. 8, 1997.
2'See, e.g., S. 8, The Superfund Cleanup Acceleration Act of 1997, 105th Cong.
(1997) (proposing that all co-disposal landfill generators, arrangers, and transporters be exempted
from liability associated with activities that took place before January 1, 1997). The bill would
also place a limit, as determined by the size of the local community, on the liability of municipal
landfill owners and operators. Id. See also Senate GOP Unveils Reauthorization Plan,
SUPERFUND WEEK, Vol. 11, No. 4, Jan. 24, 1997.
"0Camey, Badley, Smith, & Spellman, supra note 201. These reforms codified EPA's
previously adopted lender liability regulations. Id. The new regulations provide that lenders who
loan money to polluters, and lenders who choose to foreclose on loans, will be less likely to incur
CERCLA liability. Id.
2 ld. See also S. 8, The Superfund Cleanup Acceleration Act of 1997, 105th Cong.
(1997). 20Clinton Administration Outlines Firm Stand on Superfund Issues, REAL
ESTATE/LIABILITY NEWS, Vol. 8, No. 16, June 13, 1997.
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